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Comparative Analysis of British and
United States Regulations
By MICHAEL V. FANCHER
Member of the Class of 1986
I. INTRODUCTION
Genetic engineering is a new and rapidly expanding field of science
that involves the manipulation of the genetic material of existing orga-
nisms in order to produce new strains of those organisms. It promises
great benefits,I but may also create serious risks.2 In the 1970's, foremost
among the perceived risks were the possible adverse public health effects
that might be caused by an accidental escape of new microorganisms
from the laboratory.3 The primary fear was the creation of new infec-
tious diseases.4 To combat these dangers, most countries in which scien-
tists were conducting genetic engineering research established
governmental bodies to oversee the research and to issue strict contain-
1. "The federal Office of Technology Assessment's (OTA's) list of possible applications
includes the production of pharmaceuticals, such as hormones, vaccines, and antibiotics; in-
dustrial chemicals, such as plastics, polymers, and pesticides; food products, such as sweeten-
ers and enzymes; and microbes that degrade environmental pollutants and extract metals from
ores." McChesney & Adler, Biotechnology Released From the Lab: The Environmental Regula-
tory Framework, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10366 (1983). See also STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF REPORT ON THE ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING SERIAL V, 3, 9 (Comm. Print 1984)
[hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]; Rosenblatt, The Regulation of Recombinant DNA Re-
search: The Alternative of Local Control, 10 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 37, 38 (1982); Cripps,
A Legal Perspective on the Control of the Technology of Genetic Engineering, 44 MOD. L. REv.
369 (1981); Karny, Regulation of Genetic Engineering: Less Concern About Frankensteins but
Time for Action on Commercial Production, 12 TOLEDO L. REV. 815, 816 (1981); Talbot,
Introduction to Recombinant DNA Research, Development and Evolution of the NIH Guide-
lines, and Proposed Legislation, 12 TOLEDO L. REV. 804, 805-06 (1981).
2. "Like existing pollutants, bioengineered products can exhibit acute toxicity, carcino-
genicity, or other harmful environmental and health effects." McChesney & Adler, supra note
1, at 10367.
3. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3.
4. See McChesney & Adler, supra note 1, at 10366; Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 38-39.
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ment standards.5 Two of the first such governmental bodies to be estab-
lished were Great Britain's Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group
(GMAG)6 and the Recombinant Advisory Committee (RAC)7 of the
United States National Institute of Health (NIH). The GMAG and the
RAC exemplify the two principal approaches to the containment prob-
lem.8 As the new technology became better understood, however, earlier
fears subsided9 and governmental regulation gradually decreased.'0
The recent emergence of genetic engineering as a commercially via-
ble enterprise has renewed the need for regulation, and the original regu-
latory schemes are proving to be inadequate. A great deal of the research
in genetic engineering is now being conducted in the private sector rather
than in colleges and universities. 1  This private research is not regulated
in several countries. 2 Additionally, the use of many genetically engi-
neered products involves their deliberate release into the environment. 3
Some of these products are ready for field testing, 14 but new concerns are
being raised about possible side effects, unexpected toxicities, and ecolog-
ical damage.15 The GMAG and RAC regulatory schemes do not address
these fears as they were structured primarily to prevent the accidental
escape of harmful organisms from the laboratory, not to ensure the safety
of deliberate releases.16
In the United States, several federal agencies, including the Environ-
5. Berger, Corporate Responsibility for Recombinant DNA Activities, 12 TOLEDO L. REv.
913, 923 (1981). Containment standards are measures designed to contain the organisms in
the laboratory, preventing their escape into the environment. For a description of the NIH's
physical and biological containment standards, see id. at 918-20; Talbot, supra note 1, at 808-
09; Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,912-20
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines].
6. The GMAG recently was disbanded. Its functions were taken over by the new Advi-
sory Committee on Genetic Manipulation (ACGM) in 1984. The ACGM currently is review-
ing and updating the old GMAG Notes, and preparing to issue guidance Notes of its own.
The GMAG Notes continue in force until superseded. ACGM Newsletter No. 1, Aug. 1985.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74.
8. Berger, supra note 5, at 923.
9. Tooze, International and European Regulation ofRecombinant DNA Research, 12 To-
LEDO L. REv. 869, 873 (1981).
10. Id. at 883.
11. Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 39.
12. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 98TH CONG., COMMERCIAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 550-55 (1984) [hereinafter cited as COM-
MERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY].
13. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
14. Id. at 4, 17.
15. Id. at 15-16.
16. See generally id. at 3; COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 371, 375,
550-63.
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mental Protection Agency (EPA) and the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA), are considering what steps can be taken under ex-
isting law to correct these deficiencies.17 The EPA has begun to regulate
the testing and use of genetically modified microorganisms' 8 under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 9 and the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA).2" How far the EPA's jurisdiction actu-
ally reaches is unclear. Legislation has been proposed that would clearly
extend the range of TSCA to cover all genetically modified microorga-
nisms.2 The situation in Great Britain also is ambiguous. Although the
Advisory Committee on Genetic Manipulation (ACGM)22 has authority
over both government funded and private research,23 its ability to over-
see the entire range of genetic research is limited.24 It is uncertain
whether the ACGM can satisfy the new concerns over deliberate
releases.25
The rapidly changing nature of genetic engineering technology re-
quires a regulatory scheme that is both comprehensive and flexible
enough to meet new and unexpected needs. Using as an example a pro-
posed series of experiments involving the deliberate release of laboratory
developed frost reducing bacteria,26 this Note will examine the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the British and United States regulatory
schemes as well as proposals for improving those schemes. This Note
will focus on developing a formula that would cover the regulatory needs
of the United States and provide a model for other countries seeking to
develop effective controls over deliberate releases of genetically altered
organisms.
II. GENETIC ENGINEERING
A. Description
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) governs cell functions, determining
how large the cell will grow, what shape it will take, what parts it will
develop and in what order, and what chemicals it will produce. DNA is
17. See 49 Fed. Reg. 50,878-904 (1984).
18. Id. at 50,880-97.
19. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1982).
20. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601-29 (1982).
21. H.R. 4304, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983).
22. The ACGM replaces the GMAG. See supra note 6.
23. Cripps, supra note 1, at 376.
24. Id. See infra text accompanying note 114.
25. Id. Since the ACGM is basically the same as the GMAG, the same concerns con-
tinue. See supra note 6.
26. Ice-Enhancing Bacteria, GENEWATCH, May-Aug. 1984, at 11.
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the blueprint for the cell and for its role within the larger organism of
which it may be a part.2 7 Indeed, each cell's DNA contains the genetic
code for the entire organism.2" The cell performs a particular function
only when the part of its DNA that codes for that function is activated.
A segment of DNA, called a gene, contains the code for the production
of a particular protein that will perform a particular function.2 9 Genes
may be contained in long strings called chromosomes, or in smaller loops
called plasmids.3° Altering the DNA can alter the nature and functions
of the cell. Cells grown from the altered cell contain the altered DNA
code of that cell.31
Genetic researchers often work with bacteria because of the rela-
tively small amount of DNA bacteria contain. A disease-causing strain of
bacteria might be rendered harmless by deleting the gene or genes that
contain the code for the production of the particular toxin causing the
disease, or a strain of bacteria might be made more useful by inserting a
gene or genes from another organism that contains the code for the pro-
duction of a useful substance like insulin.32
In the mid-seventies scientists began developing techniques for
manipulating DNA.33 One such technique is recombinant DNA
(rDNA). This process involves the transfer of a specific segment of
DNA from one cell to another.34 This can be accomplished by chemi-
cally breaking open a group of cells and removing the DNA. Enzymes
are used to cut the DNA into segments35 that can then be glued, or li-
gated, into a "vector," often a plasmid.3 6 This vector then is introduced
into the host cell, 37 which is induced to pick up and incorporate the par-
ticular desired segment of DNA. Using rDNA, it is possible to grow a
new generation of cells that retain most of the characteristics of the host
27. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 11, at 33-38.
28. Id. at 33.
29. Brief for Appellant at 4, Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143
(D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Brief].
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Berger, supra note 5, at 915.
33. Karny, supra note 1, at 815; STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 2; McGarity & Bayer,
Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L. REv. 461, 463 (1983).
34. Talbot, supra note 1, at 804-05 n.2 and accompanying text. This technique was first
reported in 1972. Id. at 804.
35. Id. at 804 n.2; COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 36.
36. Talbot, supra note 1, at 804 n.2; COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 36.
"A plasmid is a circular, double-stranded piece of DNA which replicates in cells apart from
the chromosome." COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 36.
37. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 36.
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cell, but gain some specific characteristics from the other cell.38 Thus an
organism can be designed through rDNA to have certain desirable char-
acteristics it does not normally have.39
Other genetic engineering techniques include protoplast fusion (fus-
ing two cells to form one large cell combining the genetic material of
both parents) and chemical mutation."
B. Applications
Genetic engineering has many possible applications.4" Some appli-
cations require that genetically altered organisms be released into the en-
vironment.42 Scientists have been working on bacteria that aid in
extracting metal from ores, recovering oil from wells, and controlling
pollution.43 Bacteria and viruses may be developed to control agricul-
tural pests,' while plants may be designed to resist herbicides and harsh
environments.45
One recently developed application involves the release of bacteria
designed to reduce the formation of frost on crops.4 6 When frost forms,
water contained inside the cells of the plant also freezes. When freezing,
the water expands and bursts the cell walls, thus inflicting severe damage
on the plant.47 This crystalization, or freezing, requires some sort of cat-
alyst to start the process. 48 Although pure water can be supercooled well
38. See Karny, supra note 1, at 815.
39. See Talbot, supra note 1, at 805-06.
40. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 2; Karny, supra note 1, at 816 n.4.
41. See generally supra note 1.
42. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
43. McGarity & Bayer, supra note 33, at 471-72; STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-16.
44. Environmental Implications of Genetic Engineering: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Investigation and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess 122 (1983) (statement of Don
R. Clay, acting assistant administrator, Office of Pesticide and Toxic Substances) [hereinafter
cited as Clay statement]. The INA- bacteria, see infra text accompanying notes 46-55, has
been classified as a pesticide by the EPA. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,883 (1984).
45. McChesney & Adler, supra note 1, at 10368. Such crops could result in higher yields
per acre and help avoid food shortages. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
46. See generally Environmental Implications of Genetic Engineering: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Tech-
nology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1983) (state-
ment of Dr. Steven E. Lindow, Department of Plant Pathology, University of California at
Berkeley, one of the scientists who helped develop the technique for creating the genetically
engineered INA- bacteria).
47. For a more detailed explanation, see Comment, Regulating the Environmental Release
of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 12 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 891, 903-06 (1985).
48. Id. at 903.
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below freezing temperature (32 degrees Farenheit) without crystalizing,4 9
naturally occurring ice nucleation active (INA+) bacteria live on plants
and act to trigger frost formation at relatively high temperatures."
INA+ bacteria promote the growth of ice crystals at temperatures just
below freezing. Without these bacteria, frost may not form until the tem-
perature drops as much as eight or ten degrees below freezing.
Researchers at the University of California at Berkeley developed an
rDNA technique for removing the INA+ segment of DNA from the
bacteria Pseudomonas syringae and Erwinia herbicola, and substituting
an innocuous segment.51 This produces a strain of the bacteria (INA-)
that does not induce frost. 2 The INA- strain can then be spread on a
field to colonize the plants before the INA+ wild type bacteria can es-
tablish themselves. 3 Thus the amount of frost that normally forms on
nights when the temperature drops only slightly below freezing can be
reduced. 4 This process could reduce crop losses by one to three billion
dollars each year.55
C. Risks
Traditional fears relating to genetic engineering have centered on
the possibility that new life forms developed in the laboratory could es-
cape and harm humans by causing epidemics and poisonings. 6 Recent
concerns relating to deliberate releases focused more on possible environ-
mental damage and ecological disruption. 7 In the past, the introduction
of organisms into new environments often caused major problems. 8 Ex-
amples include the Kudzu weed, chestnut blight, the gypsy moth, Dutch
elm disease, starlings, and house sparrows.5 9
It is difficult to predict the impact that genetically altered organisms
49. Id.
50. Appellant's Brief, supra note 29, at 12. These include Pseudomonas syringae and
Erwinia herbicola. Id.
51. Appellant's Brief, supra note 29, at 13.
52. See Comment, supra note 47, at 904.
53. Id.
54. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 29, at 12.
55. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
56. Id. at 2-3.
57. Id. at 4.
58. For example, the introduction of striped bass into a Guatemalan lake destroyed the
native fishery. Id. at 1-2.
59. Complaint at 14, Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753
(D.D.C. 1984), affid in part and vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 14 ENVTL. L.
REP. 20467 (1984). Gypsy Moths, imported from Europe, periodically defoliate millions of
acres of trees in the United States. Starlings, imported from England, now annually cause
millions of dollars in crop damage. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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might have on an ecosystem. 60 Due to a selective advantage over natural
organisms, altered organisms could take over an ecological niche,61 affect
the ecological balance, 62 and prove difficult to control.63 They might also
have unforeseen side effects, such as unexpected toxicities. 64 These risks
have been described as "low probability, high consequence risks,",
65
meaning that although the likelihood of their occurring is very small, the
adverse consequences if they did occur could be catastrophic.66
In a recent lawsuit,67 several concerns were raised relating to the
release of genetically engineered INA- bacteria into the environment.68
It was feared that the INA- organisms might successfully compete
against, and thus replace, the indigenous INA+ organisms, 69 causing
unknown effects on the ecosystem. It was also feared that the organism,
if carried into the upper atmosphere in large numbers, could adversely
affect weather patterns.70 These concerns are representative of the types
of issues that must be addressed before genetically engineered organisms
are deliberately released into the environment.
I. REGULATORY HISTORY
In the early 1970's, coincident with the development of the ability to
60. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 20. Predictions are hampered by lack of data and an
ecological methodology, because we have little experience with genetically engineered orga-
nisms in the environment. Id.
61. McChesney & Adler, supra note 1, at 10368. An organism takes over an ecological
niche when it replaces another organism, monopolizing a micro-environment. For example,
short deciduous trees in a forest might be replaced by tall evergreen trees because the taller
trees are better able to get to the sunlight, while depriving the shorter deciduous trees of it.
62. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. A new organism may not fill a niche, or role
within an ecosystem, in exactly the same way as the organism it has replaced, thus affecting the
entire ecology of the area. Tall evergreen trees taking over a forest might drive out an animal
that feeds on deciduous tree leaves, and that in turn might drive out other organisms depen-
dent on that animal, and so forth.
63. Clay statement, supra note 44, at 2. Once altered organisms are established in an
environment where they are successful and can multiply, like starlings in the United States, it
is difficult to stop their reproduction and spread.
64. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. For example, if a company released bacteria
designed to combat pollution and the bacteria unexpectedly killed the corn crop, the effects on
agriculture could be devastating.
65. Id. at 9.
66. Id.
67. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984), affd in
part and vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
68. See also Comment, supra note 47, at 905-07.
69. Complaint, supra note 59, at 13-14.
70. Id. at 14. Although the complaint does not elaborate, presumably the fear is due to
the possibility of altering the temperature at which water in the air normally crystallizes. See
Comment, supra note 47, at 905-06.
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manipulate the genetic material of living organisms, scientists and others
around the world began to express concern about possible public health
risks from genetically engineered organisms.7 1 To prevent such disasters,
it was felt that controls were needed for this type of research.72
A. United States
In 1974, the United States National Institute of Health (NIH) estab-
lished the Recombinant DNA Program Advisory Committee (RAC)73 to
advise the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW) and the Director of the NIH.74 In 1976, the NIH issued its
first set of Guidelines for rDNA research. 75 These Guidelines were made
binding only on research funded by the NIH.76 Other agencies, however,
have adopted them as well, applying the Guidelines to projects they
fund. 77 Private industry apparently has followed the Guidelines
voluntarily.78
The Guidelines classified types of rDNA experiments according to
the level of risk.79 Six classifications were banned, including experiments
involving deliberate releases.8 Physical and biological containment stan-
dards were set for the other classifications, based on the level of risk of
accidental release and resulting injury to the public.8 The Guidelines
also required each regulated institution to establish an institutional bio-
hazards committee (IBC),82 which was to monitor the rDNA research
conducted by that institution and to make reports to the NIH.83
Over the years the Guidelines have been modified and relaxed. At a
71. Cripps, supra note 1, at 370.
72. See Talbot, supra note 1, at 807.
73. 39 Fed. Reg. 39,306 (1974). The RAC was established on October 7, 1974. Id.
74. Id.
75. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902-43 (1976).
76. Id. at 27,902 & 27,905-06.
77. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
78. Id.
79. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,912 (1976).
80. Id. at 27,914-15. The six prohibited classifications were: "l) the formation of rDNA
derived from certain pathogenic organisms; 2) the formation of rDNA containing genes that
make vertebrate toxins; 3) the use of the rDNA techniques to create certain plant pathogens;
4) transference of drug resistance traits to micro-organisms that cause disease in humans, ani-
mals, or plants; 5) the deliberate release of any organism containing rDNA into the environ-
ment; and 6) experiments using more than 10 liters (1) of culture unless the rDNA is rigorously
characterized and the absence of harmful sequences established." Office of Technology Assess-
ment, Impacts of Applied Genetics 212 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Applied Genetics].
81. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,912 (1976). See also supra note 5.
82. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,920 (1976).
83. Id.
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1977 workshop held in Falmouth, Massachusetts, scientists concluded
that E. coli K-12,84 a strain of bacteria used in approximately eighty per-
cent of laboratory work, 5 was harmless and could not be made danger-
ous through rDNA techniques.8 6 In 1978, the NIH issued revised
Guidelines87 that lowered containment levels,88 exempted certain classifi-
cations of experiments from regulation, 9 and allowed the Director of the
NIH to exempt specific individual experiments from the Guidelines'
prohibitions.9 Thus it became possible for deliberate releases, previously
strictly banned, to be individually approved. In addition, the local IBCs
were given more power to make decisions without NIH review,91 and the
RAC was expanded.92 Many of the new seats on the RAC were filled by
public representatives, 93 and all relevant federal agencies were made non-
voting members.94
Pressure to make additional modifications of the Guidelines contin-
ued. In 1979, a group of molecular biologists at an international confer-
ence issued a statement on rDNA research. 95 The scientists agreed that
the public health risks associated with genetic engineering had been exag-
gerated and that governmental guidelines should be further relaxed96 or
abolished. In 1980, the NIH placed the responsibility for supervision of
experiments on the local IBCs. 97 In 1981, research with E. coil K-12 and
several other organisms was exempted from NIH regulation.98 In 1982,
deliberate releases were removed entirely from the list of prohibited ex-
84. Talbot, supra note 1, at 811.
85. Applied Genetics, supra note 80, at 212.
86. Talbot, supra note 1, at 811.
87. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,108 (1978).
88. Experiments generally were assigned to lower containment levels. Talbot, supra note
1, at 812.
89. Exempted from the Guidelines were rDNA molecules which: 1) were not in orga-
nisms or viruses; 2) were from a single nonchromosomal or viral DNA source; 3) were propa-
gated in their hosts or transferred by well-established physiological means; 4) were from
species that exchange DNA by known physiological processes; or 5) the Director of the NIH
found not to present a significant risk to health or the environment. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,108-09
(1978).
90. Id. at 60,108.
91. "Pre-initiation review of most experiments no longer had to be done by the NIH, but
could now be done by the local oversight committee." Karny, supra note 1, at 818 n.15.
92. Tooze, supra note 9, at 883.
93. Id.
94. Talbot, supra note 1, at 812.
95. This conference, held at Wye College in Kent, England, included delegates from 31
countries. Cripps, supra note 1, at 370.
96. Id.
97. 45 Fed. Reg. 77,398-400 (1980).
98. 46 Fed. Reg. 34,485 (1981).
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periments, although specific approval for individual experiments still was
required. 99 Finally, in April 1983, the NIH issued new relaxed Guide-
lines for the field testing of genetically altered plants."0
B. Great Britain
At the same time that the NIH was preparing its Guidelines, Great
Britain also was developing guidelines for genetic research. Early in
1976, a proposed code of laboratory practice was promulgated that di-
vided rDNA experiments into four classifications."0 ' The code recom-
mended that a central advisory committee, the Genetic Manipulation
Advisory Group (GMAG),10 2 be created. 103 Rather than listing the spe-
cific measures to contain each type of experiment, the GMAG would
devise containment standards for each classification and then decide into
which classification individual experiments fell."° Classification of ex-
periments was to be done on a case-by-case basis, establishing a body of
precedent to aid in future decisionmaking. 05 The formation of local
safety committees for each laboratory also was suggested. 10 6
On December 8, 1976, the GMAG was officially established as a
branch of the Department of Education and Science.10 7 The GMAG
was given no binding authority, but merely the power to advise scientists
as to the appropriate classification of their work.0 8 The GMAG was
composed of eight scientists, four trade union representatives, five public
representatives, and two managerial representatives. 0 9
The GMAG remained a mere advisory body until August 1978,
when the British government issued the Health and Safety (Genetic Ma-
nipulation) Regulations under section 15 of the Health and Safety at
Work Act of 1974.110 Under these regulations, consultation with the
GMAG and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) was mandatory for
99. 47 Fed. Reg. 17,187 (1982).
100. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,548 (1983).
101. Tooze, supra note 9, at 880 (citing Report of the Working Party on the Practice of
Genetic Manipulation, Cmd. 6600 (1976)).
102. See supra note 6.
103. Tooze, supra note 9, at 880.
104. See Cripps, supra note 1, at 373.
105. Id.
106. Cripps, supra note 1, at 373.
107. Id. at 374.
108. Id. In its first year it gave advice on 102 proposals, generally within five weeks of
receiving them. Id. at 374-75.
109. Id. at 374.
110. Id. at 375; Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974, ch. 37.
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all researchers involved in genetic manipulation.' The GMAG moni-
tored the research and promulgated rules, while the HSE enforced
them.I12 The regulations expanded the definition of work under the Act
to include "any activity involving genetic manipulation."' 13 But the reg-
ulations did not restrict or control the use of the products of genetic
manipulation, or protect plant or animal life." 4 In 1980, the GMAG
decided to exempt from review all research that did not involve known
pathogens or organisms producing toxins. 115
IV. PRESENT REGULATORY SCHEMES
A. United States
The risk of accidental escape largely has been alleviated by the im-
plementation of containment standards and the reassessment of the at-
tendant risks." 6 Today a new concern has arisen over the possible
environmental effects of deliberate releases of genetically engineered or-
ganisms.' 17 Genetic engineering technology has advanced to the point
where several products are ready or nearly ready for field testing,"'
which would involve relatively large-scale releases. At the time of this
writing, a company in Oakland, California, Advanced Genetic Sciences
(AGS), has secured EPA permission" 9 to field test the INA- bacteria
(under the trade name Frost Ban).' 20
1. The National Institute of Health
A 1984 government report concluded, "The NIH RAC currently is
the only federal entity with active responsibility for evaluating risks asso-
ciated with research-scale field work. The RAC's limited jurisdiction,
focus, and membership, however, make it il-equipped to address the en-
vironmental risks posed by large-scale releases by commercial biotech-
nology firms."' 2
There are several major limitations on the regulatory jurisdiction of
111. Tooze, supra note 9, at 881.
112. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 553.
113. Cripps, supra note 1, at 376.
114. Id.
115. Tooze, supra note 9, at 884; GMAG Note 14 (Sept. 1980).
116. Karny, supra note 1, at 817.
117. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
118. Id.
119. 50 Fed. Reg. 49,760-62 (1985). "These are the first genetically engineered biological
pesticides for which experimental use permits (EUPs) have been approved." Id. at 49,760-61.
120. Id.
121. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.
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the NIH. First, the NIH Guidelines are not binding on private indus-
try.'22 Second, the authority of the RAC is limited by its charter to a
restricted range of DNA techniques.'23 Only rDNA techniques seem to
be included. Cell fusion, chemical mutation, and certain other genetic
engineering techniques appear not to be within the scope of the RAC's
regulatory authority.' 24
Researchers at the University of California at Berkeley who devel-
oped the genetically engineered form of the INA - bacteria, after testing
it in the laboratory and in greenhouses, proposed controlled field testing
on test plots in California.' 25 Because the University of California re-
ceives federal funds, its researchers are subject to the NIH Guidelines,
including the requirement that the Director of the NIH approve deliber-
ate releases. Therefore, they submitted their proposal to the NIH.'26 The
RAC voted unanimously to recommend approval of the experiment,' 27
and on June 1, 1983, formal approval of the Director was given.'2 "
Subsequent to the approval, several citizen groups, headed by ac-
tivist Jeremy Rifkin, filed suit to block the releases.'29 After hearings,
the federal district court issued an injunction 130 blocking NIH approval
of all experiments involving the deliberate release of rDNA on the
ground that the NIH had not fulfilled its obligations under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).13  NEPA requires the compilation
of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to any "major Fed-
eral actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment."' 132 The court held that the NIH's 1978 decision to allow the
approval of deliberate releases was such an action and that it had not
compiled an adequate EIS.' 13 The NIH was therefore prevented from
approving deliberate releases of the INA- bacteria until a new EIS
could be filed. 134 The decision also made clear, however, that private
122. Id. at 27. Private industry generally has followed the Guidelines voluntarily. Id. at 3.
123. Id. at 26-27.
124. McChesney & Adler, supra note 1, at 10370. Thus, INA- bacteria created through
chemical mutation rather than through rDNA appear not to be covered by the Guidelines.
125. Appellant's Brief, supra note 29, at 12-13.
126. Id. at 12.
127. Id. at 16-17.
128. Id. at 17.
129. Id.
130. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753, 769 (D.D.C. 1984),
affid in part and vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
131. Id. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as NEPA].
132. NEPA § 4332(2)(C).
133. Foundation on Economic Trends, 587 F. Supp. at 764.
134. Id. at 769.
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industry may proceed with testing involving deliberate releases. 135 While
the NIH approves such testing as a service, its review is nonbinding in
those cases.136 The NIH RAC voted to approve AGS's INA- field
tests. 137 The court of appeals affirmed the injunction as to the University
of California experiment, but vacated the injunction as to all other exper-
iments. 3  The court's decision was based on its finding that "the 1978
policy change did not necessarily represent the point of commitment that
triggers NEPA [and] significant changes have occurred since 1978.' 139
The court stated, however, that it shared the district court's concern that
NIH had not given adequate consideration to the issues and thus left
open the possibility that NIH approvals of other deliberate releases could
be enjoined individually on the same grounds.' 4°
In addition to its jurisdictional limitations, the limited focus of the
NIH on containment 141 is a problem. Its members are primarily molecu-
lar biologists and health experts, 42 trained to evaluate the organisms
themselves and their possible effects on human health. The committee
was formed in response to the original concern as to the effect of acciden-
tal release on people, not the environmental effects of deliberate releases.
Therefore, it has no members trained in ecology or other environmental
sciences.' 43 Thus, "[t]he RAC may well discuss the potential environ-
mental implications of a deliberate release, but it does not possess the
expertise to adequately evaluate those implications." 1"
Moreover, the RAC review procedure is also limiting. 45 Instead of
undertaking a major comprehensive review of proposals, RAC members
must vote after analyzing ony the materials the researchers have chosen
to supply.146 The RAC can request additional information,147 but there
135. Id. at 767. See Sun, Biotechnology's Regulatory Tangle, 225 SCIENCE 697 (17 Aug.
1984).
136. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 48.
137. Federal Judge Stops Field Tests, GENEWATCH, May-Aug. 1984, at 7.
138. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
142. Environmental Implications of Genetic Engineering: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1983) (statement of Geof-
frey M. Karny, Senior Analyst, Biological Applications Program, Office of Technology Assess-
ment) [hereinafter cited as Karny statement].
143. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
144. Id. (emphasis in original).
145. Id.
146. Karny statement, supra note 142, at 31.
147. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
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is no guarantee that what it receives will be either complete or objective.
Indeed, the whole RAC review process is so informal that one observer
has testified, "There is, as yet, no standardized method for evaluating
requests for field testing and no established criteria for what information
is needed to make a decision."14'
2. The Environmental Protection Agency
Certain other federal agencies, primarily the EPA, the USDA, and
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), are taking steps to fill in gaps
in the genetic engineering regulatory structure.'49 The EPA has been the
most active in this area, primarily through the use of two statutes it ad-
ministers: the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 50 and the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).151
a. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
The EPA has jurisdiction under FIFRA to regulate pesticides,"5 2
which include "genetically engineered microbial pesticides."' 53 FIFRA
provides that no pesticide may be sold, shipped, or distributed until it is
registered with the EPA.154 It specifies further that the EPA Adminis-
trator shall register the pesticide only after he or she "determines that
.* .when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recog-
nized practice it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on
the environment."' 55 Thus, the manufacturer must establish to the
EPA's satisfaction that the pesticide is safe before it can be sold.
There are two principal exceptions to the registration requirement.
First, a pesticide may be distributed and used within the terms of a pre-
registration experimental use permit (EUP).156 Use under this permit is
strictly controlled and allows only the testing necessary for obtaining the
data required for registration. 157 Second, the EPA may waive the EUP
requirement when the tester does not expect to receive any benefit other
148. Id. at 29.
149. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,856-58 (1984).
150. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
TSCA].
151. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982)
[hereinafter cited as FIFRA].
152. Id. § 136a.
153. See generally 49 Fed. Reg. 50,881-86 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 162.5(c)(4)).
154. FIFRA § 136a.
155. Id.
156. Id. § 136c.
157. Id.
[Vol. 9
Genetically Modified Organisms
than data collection, and the testing is not believed to pose serious envi-
ronmental or human health concerns. 158 Small-scale testing, defined as
that involving less than ten acres of land or one acre of water surface,
generally is presumed by the EPA to meet waiver requirements.15 9 The
agency, however, has adopted an interim policy which requires that it be
notified at least ninety days in advance of any small-scale testing involv-
ing genetically engineered microbial pesticides.160 The EPA then decides
on a case-by-case basis whether that testing requires an EUP 1 61
The first inquiry the EPA received concerning the application of
FIFRA to a genetically modified substance was for the testing of INA-
bacteria.1 62 The agency concluded that the strain of bacteria was a pesti-
cide and thus subject to FIFRA requirements.1 6 As previously men-
tioned, an EUP has been granted. 1
There are two possible problems with the EPA's assertion of author-
ity in this particular case. First, there is the question of whether the
strain of INA- bacteria is a pesticide, as it merely reduces weather dam-
age by competing with, rather than killing, the INA+ bacteria. Second,
assuming the EPA's power to regulate is derived from Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce, there is also the question of whether the
EPA has jurisdiction over planned intrastate testing not involving any
distribution or shipment in interstate commerce.
b. Toxic Substances Control Act
TSCA gives the EPA broad jurisdiction over the manufacture,
processing, distribution, use, and disposal of chemical substances and
mixtures. 65 Under TSCA, "chemical substance" is defined as "any or-
ganic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity, including
• . . any combination of such substances occurring in whole or in part as
a result of a chemical reaction or occurring in nature . . ,,66 A "mix-
ture" is defined as "any combination of two or more chemical substances
if the combination does not occur in nature and is not, in whole or in
158. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,880, 50,885 (1984).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 50,885-86.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 50,883.
163. Abramson, Memorandum to Don R. Clay (Oct. 26, 1983), reprinted in STAFF RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 146.
164. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
165. TSCA § 2601.
166. Id. § 2602(2)(A).
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part, the result of a chemical reaction .... ""'
Legislative history indicates that Congress intended TSCA to be
very inclusive.16 The EPA argues that rDNA is a "chemical substance"
and that any living organism is a "combination" of chemical substances
under TSCA. 16 9 This reasoning, however, would extend the scope of
TSCA to include the entire universe, and therefore, it is uncertain
whether a court would be persuaded by this argument. The Court could
instead hold that Congress did not intend to include genetically engi-
neered or other life forms under TSCA and that such organisms are not
"manufactured," but rather are grown. 170 In doing so, a court might be
guided by the statute's own language, which indicates that the statute
should not be applied to hinder innovation.
171
Under TSCA, a manufacturer must submit a premanufacture notifi-
cation (PMN), which includes specified test data, to the EPA at least
ninety days before beginning to manufacture a "new" chemical substance
or mixture for commercial purposes.172 "New" means that the substance
is neither listed on the EPA's Chemical Substances Inventory nor "natu-
rally occurring."' 173 The EPA has concluded that microorganisms whose
nucleic acids are produced through chemical synthesis and those geneti-
cally modified through rDNA, rRNA, or cell fusion are "new" and thus
subject to PMN requirements. 174 The agency proposes to decide whether
an organism is naturally occurring on the basis of the techniques used to
produce it. 17  Under the proposal, a genetically engineered organism
could be subject to PMN even though an identical organism exists in
nature. The agency is reserving judgment on whether other genetic engi-
neering techniques can sucessfully produce new commercial substances
and thus become subject to PMN. 176
If interpreted to include microorganisms, TSCA has the potential to
167. Id. § 2602(8).
168. McChesney & Adler, supra note 1, at 10374, citing S. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in TSCA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE Toxic SUBSTANCE CONTROL ACT
253 (1976). The EPA cites a 1976 House Committee report which notes that "the Committee
recognizes that basically everything in our environment is composed of chemical substances
and therefore the definition of chemical substance is necessarily somewhat broad." 49 Fed.
Reg. 50,887 (1984).
169. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,886 (1984). See also McChesney & Adler, supra note 1, at 10374.
170. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 33.
171. TSCA § 2601.
172. Id. § 2604 defines "manufacturing" to mean manufacturing for commercial purposes.
173. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,880, 50,887 (1984).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 50,888-89.
176. Id. at 50,889-90.
[Vol. 9
Genetically Modified Organisms
fill in many of the gaps in the existing regulatory framework. Under this
interpretation, it would subject most genetically engineered products not
covered by other regulations to broad data gathering and regulatory
powers. This is an imperfect solution. First, there is the possibility that
the courts would strike down this broad interpretation of "chemical sub-
stances." Second, even if TSCA is interpreted as including microorga-
nisms, it does not appear to provide a means to regulate either testing or
deliberate releases occurring before a PMN is filed.
If AGS's INA- bacteria were found by a court not to be a pesti-
cide, they could still come under the provisions of TSCA. Two questions
which then arise are whether bacteria produced for research rather than
for commercial purposes would be subject to TSCA, and whether a living
microorganism is either a "chemical substance" or the product of "man-
ufacturing" for TSCA purposes.
A key issue to the applicability of TSCA is the meaning of the term
"manufacture," '177 which is defined as "manufacturing. .. for commer-
cial purposes. '  The statute cannot cover creation of a new organism
for future commercial application because of the type of test data that
must accompany the PMN. Since a PMN must be filed 90 days before
manufacture, the test data would be required ninety days before the first
batch could be grown for testing. This leaves only one other possibility,
that "manufacture" means the stage at which the organisms are being
grown, rather than created, for commercial use. This could occur long
after most testing, which may include deliberate releases into the natural
environment, has been completed. Under this analysis, if a company
such as AGS does not contemplate actual commercial production of the
organism, but only conducts research aimed at selling the process for
producing the organism, then the company may never be subject to
TSCA regulation. This exception to regulation could be critical, since
the risks associated with deliberate releases may arise without wide-
spread use of the microorganism created. Unlike chemicals such as
DDT, the organisms once released have the potential to multiply.1 79 A
company that develops an organism without proper research could un-
leash an organism capable of wreaking serious ecological damage over
huge areas. Obviously this is a worst-case scenario, but it is precisely the
type of situation TSCA is designed to prevent.
A third problem with TSCA is the heavy burden of proof placed on
177. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. See McChesney & Adler, supra note 1, at 10367.
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the EPA.18 ° Under sections 4, 5, and 6 of TSCA, the EPA must deter-
mine that the substance "may present an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment" before it can regulate the substance.' Thus,
not even a showing of risk allows the EPA to take final action; it must
also show that the risk is unreasonable. It is unclear at which point the
low-probability-of-high-consequence risks associated with the deliberate
release of genetically modified organisms could become unreasonable.
c. Other Laws Applicable to Deliberate Releases
In addition to FIFRA and TSCA, the EPA acts under the authority
of several other statutes that may be applicable to the release of geneti-
cally engineered organisms. The Clean Water Act (CWA) 82 includes
"biological materials" within the definition of "pollutants."' 83 To be reg-
ulated, however, the pollutant must be discharged into the nation's sur-
face waters from a point source. 184  For example, dumping waste
organisms into surface water or applying oil-eating bacteria to an oil spill
would be covered by CWA. Most releases, however, would not be cov-
ered, either because they are not entering the nation's surface water or
because they are not entering that water from a point source.185 The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA)'86 provides for the cleanup of "hazardous sub-
stances."' 7 This Act imposes liability on the releasing party for the
cleanup, 88 but does not prohibit the release itself.'89 If the releasing
company fears liability for the harm the organism may cause, this may be
a factor in a decision to release. Such potential liability does not in itself
prevent the release. Neither of these statutes is likely to affect AGS's
field tests. CWA does not govern because the genetically altered organ-
180. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 33-34; Karny statement, supra note 142, at 9-10.
181. TSCA §§ 2603-2605.
182. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
183. Id. § 1362(6).
184. Id. §§ 1342, 1362. "The term 'point source' means any discernible, confined and dis-
crete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not
include return flows from irrigated agriculture." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). See also McChesney &
Adler, supra note 1, at 10379.
185. Where the organisms are being applied on land as where they are sprayed on crops,
they would only enter the water as runoff, and therefore would not be from "point sources."
186. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 et seq. (1982).
187. Id. § 9604. For a definition of "hazardous substance", see id. § 9601(14).
188. Id. § 9607.
189. See also McChesney & Adler, supra note 1, at 10379.
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ism is to be applied not to water but to plants on land. 19' Any eventual
presence in surface water would only be the result of ground water seep-
age or runoff, which is not covered under CWA. 191 CERCLA would
apply after the release only if the organism harmed human health or the
environment. 192
3. The United States Department of Agriculture
The USDA also has limited jurisdiction over genetic engineering. It
oversees and applies the NIH Guidelines to all genetic research it
funds. 19 3 In addition, several statutes give the USDA authority to regu-
late the movement of plants and animals within the United States. The
Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA),1 94 Federal Noxious Weed Act
(FNWA),195 and Plant Quarantine Act (PQA) 196 give the USDA author-
ity to regulate harmful plants and organisms harmful to plants. 197
Therefore, genetically engineered plants and microorganisms that are
shown to be harmful to agriculture could be regulated by the USDA
under these statutes.
However, there are several major limitations. First, the regulated
plant or organism may have to be proven harmful before it can be regu-
lated, and a showing of risk may be insufficient. 198 Thus, the USDA
might not be able to exercise jurisdiction until after extensive field testing
of an organism like AGS's INA- bacteria has been completed. There-
fore, the USDA regulations appear to protect agriculture from wide-
spread commercial use of a harmful organism, but not from the risk of an
organism spreading from its testing site. Additionally, these regulations
appear to focus on the direct harm these plants and organisms could
cause, and not on the indirect environmental damage that could result.
Thus, the USDA's regulatory authority would not address damage such
as the weather changes that some have claimed the INA- bacteria
might cause. 199 Finally, the USDA's jurisdiction is largely limited to the
importation and transportation of harmful plants and organisms in inter-
190. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
191. Id.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982).
193. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,898 (1984).
194. Federal Plant Pest Act, 7 U.S.C. § 150aa-jj (1982) [hereinafter cited as FPPA].
195. Federal Noxious Weed Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2813 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
FNWA].
196. Plant Quarantine Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1982).
197. See McChesney & Adler, supra note 1, at 10376-77.
198. See id. Both FNWA and FPPA require a determination that the regulated organism
"can injure." FNWA, § 150aa; FPPA § 2802(c).
199. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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state commerce. 2° Thus the USDA would be prevented from interfering
in the development and testing of genetically engineered organisms.
4. The Food and Drug Administration
The FDA is developing regulations to cover genetically engineered
foods, drugs, food additives, and other products.201 Its primary concern,
however, is the safety of the product for human consumption.20 2 While
the FDA might oversee the use of AGS's INA- bacteria in order to
ensure the safety of humans who consume them indirectly through the
food chain, it will not be concerned with environmental consequences of
the deliberate release of the bacteria. The FDA, then, does not regulate
deliberate releases as such, but only some of the uses to which the orga-
nisms are put.
In the United States, the regulation of genetic engineering consists
of a patchwork scheme involving several administrative agencies. Not
much legislation has been passed that directly addresses genetic engineer-
ing, and existing statutes are being used to form a regulatory quilt in
which the NIH oversees federally funded research, the EPA oversees
public health and the environment, the USDA regulates agriculture, and
the FDA protects humans from adulterated foods and drugs. Thus, a
company such as AGS might have to deal with multiple agencies to test
and market a single product like the INA- bacteria.
B. Great Britain
Great Britain's regulatory structure is much simpler than that of the
United States. In Great Britain, the regulation of genetic engineering,
including deliberate releases, is consolidated primarily under the author-
ity of one organization, the Advisory Committee on Genetic Manipula-
tion (ACGM),2 °3 with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) providing
enforcement. 2 ' No person may carry on any activity involving genetic
manipulation unless he or she has notified both the HSE and the
ACGM. 20 5 The HSE may make exemptions from that requirement, but
it must consult the ACGM first.206 The ACGM itself is an advisory
200. FPPA § 150bb; FNWA, § 2803.
201. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,878-80 (1984).
202. Id.
203. See supra note 6.
204. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 553.
205. Health and Safety Regulations (Genetic Manipulation), 1978, Reg. 5.
206. Id. at Reg. 6.
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body.207 Its main functions are "to review and assess the conjectured
hazards of any activities involving genetic manipulation as defined; 0 8 to
categorize individual experiments according to the appropriate level of
physical and biological containment; [and] to advise on the application of
the code of practice recommended in the Report of the Working Party on
the Practice of Genetic Manipulation."20 9
The HSE, meanwhile, has general responibility for enforcing the
Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974.210 Under the Act, HSE inspec-
tors have extensive powers to enforce experimenters' general duties to
avoid endangering the health and safety of workers or of the general pub-
lic,2 11 to issue improvement notices,212 and to issue prohibition no-
tices.2 13 The Health and Safety Commission has instructed the HSE to
enforce the GMAG's (now ACGM) recommended precautions to the ex-
tent they relate to human health and safety.214
As of its Third Report, issued in 1982,215 the GMAG had deter-
mined that "the hazards specifically attributable to genetic manipulation
of micro-organisms are, if they exist at all, far less than were conjectured
when the [GMAG] was set up and can be contained by appropriate bio-
logical and physical containment. 21 6 Thus, regulatory emphasis ap-
pears to have shifted from the "construction" of genetically manipulated
organisms to their "use. "217 This shift may be due to the fact that "con-
struction" is done in the laboratory and is contained easily, whereas
"use" may involve large-scale work and deliberate releases into the envi-
ronment.218 Even though "use" is not covered specifically by the
GMAG regulations, the GMAG considers itself to have sufficient au-
207. Health and Safety Regulations (Genetic Manipulation), 1978, Guidance Note 2.
208. "Genetic manipulation" is defined as "the formation of new combinations of heritable
material by the insertion of nucleic acid molecules, produced by whatever means outside the
cell, into any virus, bacterial plasmid, or other vector system so as to allow their incorporation
into a host organism in which they do not naturally occur but in which they are capable of
continued propagation." Health and Safety Regulations (Genetic Manipulation), 1978, Reg.
2.
209. Guidance Note 2, supra note 207.
210. Id.
211. Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974, ch. 37, § 20.
212. Id. § 21.
213. Id. § 22.
214. Guidance Note 11, supra note 207.
215. GENETIC MANIPULATION ADVISORY GROUP, THIRD REPORT, CMD. No. 8665
(1982).
216. Id. at 3.
217. Id. at 3 and 7.
218. Id. at 7.
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thority to review all such work.2 19
The GMAG (now ACGM) has stated that it desires to be informed
at the earliest possible stage of any research whose objective is deliberate
release. 220 Each proposal for such research is reviewed on a case-by-case
basis.221
Other government agencies are involved too. Work involving plant
pests must be licensed also by the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and
Food (MAFF), the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scot-
land (DAFS), or the Forestry Commission Secretariat (FCS).222 The
ACGM, however, advises these agencies on the genetic manipulation as-
pects of the work to be licensed.223
As of its Third Report, the GMAG had not issued any guidance
notes on deliberate releases of genetically manipulated organisms. 224 It
had expressed, however, an intention to maintain a close liaison with the
MAFF and the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) to en-
sure close surveillance of work involving deliberate releases.225 The
ACGM has recently announced its intention to issue specific guidance in
early 1986 covering the release of genetically manipulated organisms for
agricultural and environmental purposes.226
If AGS were to do its research in Great Britain, it would have to
inform the ACGM of its INA- work.227 The extent of the ACGM's
supervision might be very narrow, however, as the ACGM's enabling act
does not protect plants and animals.228 Thus, it is unclear at present
what environmental considerations the ACGM could include in future
regulations concerning deliberate releases. It would, of course, be able to
include environmental considerations in advisory opinions to the com-
pany or to government agencies.229 Possibly the INA- research would
be interpreted as involving plant pests, thus requiring licensing. The De-
partment of the Environment might also take cognizance of the problem,
though local governments do much of the actual environmental regula-
219. Id.
220. Id. at 10.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 11.
226. ACGM Newsletter No.1, Aug. 1985. The ACGM replaces the GMAC. See supra
note 6.
227. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text accompanying note 114.
229. See text accompanying notes 222-23.
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tion in Great Britain.23 ° Because no law specifically covers the environ-
mental impact of biotechnology,23' it would probably be left to the
ACGM and local government, especially since the problem is more bio-
hazard than pollution.
C. Comparison
Both the United States and Great Britain appear to have a problem
with gaps in their regulatory authority. In the United States it is a ques-
tion of whether there is regulatory authority over a given experiment.
The EPA's ability to fill the gaps under TSCA is questionable. In Great
Britain there is a question of whether the ACGM has authority to con-
sider environmental issues, and whether the HSE or any other govern-
mental agency has authority to enforce ACGM decisions relating to
those issues.
The British system does have the main advantage of centralization.
A researcher need only look to one source for guidance on its experi-
ments. Approval for experiments can be gained quickly and simply. The
ACGM coordinates the efforts of various government departments with
respect to genetic engineering and provides a consistent set of standards
for all to follow. Therefore, guidance can be given for all types of genetic
experiments.
V. PROPOSALS
In the United States, where genetic engineering technology seems to
be the most advanced, several improvements to the present regulatory
system have recently been proposed. These proposals attempt to address
the problems posed by deliberate releases, and include both amending
TSCA and forming an interagency committee to coordinate enforcement
of existing statutes.
A. Recent Proposals for the United States
1. Amend TSCA
One of the simplest proposals would merely clarify congressional
intent regarding the applicability of TSCA to genetically engineered or-
ganisms. Representative Florio submitted a bill to the 98th Congress
which would have amended TSCA to include "any microorganism or
230. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 557.
231. Id.
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other biological substance." 232 This measure alone would close one of
the largest holes in the regulatory net. It would eliminate doubt about
the EPA's authority to regulate deliberate releases of genetically engi-
neered microorganisms. Genetically engineered plants and animals
would remain under the authority of the USDA and FDA, but the risks
with these higher life forms are significantly lower because they multiply
much slower than microorganisms.
Even with these proposed changes, many gaps would remain in the
regulatory scheme. The environmental impacts of genetically engineered
plants and animals are not adequately considered under USDA and
FDA enabling statutes, as these agencies focus primarily on direct harm
to humans and agriculture. The EPA still would not be notified until
ninety days before manufacture, leaving open the question of whether
earlier testing could be regulated. The EPA's burden to show an unrea-
sonable risk remains before the organism could be regulated. Questions
have also been raised as to the expertise available within the EPA to deal
with genetic engineering.233
2. Congressional Subcommittee's Proposal
A more extensive proposal was made by a Congressional subcom-
mittee investigating the environmental implications of genetic engineer-
ing.234 Its report stated that research and commercialism should be
permitted to proceed with minimum interference. 235 The subcommittee
recognized, however, that it is still difficult to predict the environmental
effects of deliberate releases.236 It concluded that "the current regulatory
framework does not guarantee that adequate consideration will be given
to the potential environmental effects of a deliberate release. ' 237 Accord-
ingly, it made a number of recommendations.
The first recommendation is that the EPA continue to regulate
under TSCA all deliberate releases of organisms not specifically within
the jurisdiction of another statute.238 According to the subcommittee,
TSCA provides sufficient authority to regulate deliberate releases,239 but
the EPA is unlikely to gain the needed expertise in the near future. The
subcommittee noted that the EPA itself has estimated that it will take
232. H.R. 4304, supra note 21, at 2.
233. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.
234. Id. at 43-44.
235. Id. at 43.
236. Id. at 25.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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several years to develop the necessary regulations.2' To fill this vacuum,
the subcommittee recommended that the EPA take the initiative in form-
ing an interagency task force to review all proposals involving deliberate
releases.2 4 1 This task force would be made up of representatives from the
EPA, NIH, USDA, and any other appropriate agencies or entities. 242
After the individual agencies collect data on proposals for deliberate re-
leases, the task force would review the data and make a recommendation
on whether to allow such a release.24 3 It would endeavor to develop a
uniform set of flexible guidelines for evaluating proposals. 2 " It also
would bring together the data gathered by the various agencies into one
data base to aid decisionmaking.2 45 Finally, it would coordinate the ef-
forts of the various agencies and settle any jurisdictional disputes.24 6
Bringing the RAC into this task force could convert the task force
into a type of super-RAC. The scientific expertise of the RAC could be
melded with the environmental expertise of the EPA, as well as with the
expertise of other relevant agencies. With broad supervisory responsibil-
ity placed in the hands of such a task force, the jurisdictions of the vari-
ous agencies could be coordinated so as to achieve the broadest possible
regulatory power available under the existing laws. Also, uniform guide-
lines could be established and kept flexible. This proposal would facili-
tate rapid decisionmaking by providing a centralized data base, thus
eliminating confusion and uncertainty.24 7 The task force need not be
temporary, but could exist as long as concerns over the safety of genetic
engineering remain.248 The report recommended that no decision on per-
manency be made until after the adequacy of the EPA's efforts is
known,2 49 noting that current EPA manpower shortages and proposed
budgetary restrictions may hinder those efforts.2 5 ° The benefits of uni-
formity, flexibilty, coordination, broad expertise, and centralization of
data argue for continuation.
Furthermore, the proposal suggests that the task force be given veto
power so that no agency could approve any release without the recom-
240. Id. at 46.
241. Id. at 43.
242. Id. at 45.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 46.
249. See id. at 50.
250. Id.
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mendation of the task force.2"' This would ensure both consistency in
decisionmaking and the application of adequate expertise.25 2 Presuma-
bly, decisions by the task force settling jurisdictional disputes among
agencies would also be binding.
A third element of the proposal calls for both the NIH RAC and the
USDA RAC to include ecologists and environmental scientists among
their members.253 Under this proposal both the NIH and the USDA
would continue to have their areas of regulation to oversee, so it is appro-
priate that they be qualified to address environmental concerns relating
to deliberate releases they might approve.254 In addition, the NIH RAC
probably would be a major participant in the task force.255
Fourth, the proposal calls for a review by the Government Account-
ing Office (GAO) to define the jurisdictional reach of the USDA.25 6 It
states that the USDA may have much more authority over genetic engi-
neering than it is exercising.257
An advantage of the subcommittee's proposal is that it can be imple-
mented simply. It does not require the passage of new legislation. As a
practical matter this is important. A newly created agency with total
authority over genetic engineering might be a better solution,25 8 but to
create one would require much more time and effort. A solution is
needed now, and this proposal could be implemented very quickly.
3. Working Group's Proposal
The Cabinet Council Working Group on Biotechnology has simi-
larly proposed a centralized authority, consisting of "a two-tiered struc-
ture composed of five agency-based scientific advisory committees under
a coordinating parent board. ' 259 The NIH, EPA, FDA, USDA, and the
National Science Foundation (NSF) each would sponsor a committee to
provide scientific advice on the sponsoring agency's area of regulatory
concern. 260 The parent Biotechnology Science Board, under the Depart-
251. Id. at 43.
252. Id. at 50.
253. Id. at 44.
254. Id. at 49.
255. See supra text accompanying note 242.
256. Id. at 44, 49.
257. Id. at 49.
258. The proposal is still somewhat of a patchwork approach and does not ensure that all
genetic work is regulated by an administrative agency. A new agency could be given such
authority.
259. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,880, 50,904 (1984).
260. Id. at 50,905.
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ment of Health and Human Services, would include two members of
each of the five committees.261 Its function would be to review commit-
tee reports, to direct certain questions to the committees for study, and
generally to coordinate and oversee the workings of the committees.262
There is fear that if the workload and bureaucracy were increased,
the committee might no longer attract the number of highly qualified
scientists who currently volunteer.263 The Working Group's proposal,
however, attempts to eliminate that concern by dividing up the workload
among the five committees, leaving the parent board free to consider the
more general questions of long range goals and directions.
B. Combining Proposals
The best solution appears to be one that combines the clarifying ef-
fects of new legislation with the advantages of a centralized authority.
This alternative proposal seeks to combine the better elements of the
three previous proposals.
The subcommittee and Working Group have both proposed meth-
ods for coordinating agencies under a central authority. Although both
proposals have merit, the Working Group's proposal appears to be pref-
erable. By dividing up the work among five committees, the proposal
frees the parent board to concentrate on larger issues relating to genetic
engineering and on cases of special importance. It also reduces the work-
load of individual committee members. To obtain the best scientific ad-
vice, the committees must include top scientists who are active in the
field and who can stay abreast of new developments. Obviously, these
scientists have only limited time for committee meetings. If only one
interagency task force were created to review all proposals, the workload
could become prohibitive for active scientists, especially as more and
more companies bring products to the field-testing stage. Five separate
committees, however, would be better equipped to handle the contem-
plated flood of proposals and would allow the committee members to
meet their commitments as practicing scientists. Keeping the commit-
tees small might also help to prevent an overly burdensome bureaucracy.
Of course, the parent board would need to have active scientific members
as well, since it would be reviewing all proposals, but the fact that it
would primarily review previously made recommendations should pre-
vent an undue workload. In most cases the original advisory committee
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Sun, supra note 135, at 698.
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would have already finished reviewing, analyzing, and summarizing data,
as well as investigating potential risks, and generating a
recommendation.
The subcommittee's task force proposal has the advantage of utiliz-
ing the broadest expertise available. On the other hand, the Working
Group's parent board also would have broad expertise. It could call on
any of the committee members and would review recommendations of
the advisory committees to ensure that all considerations had been ad-
dressed. Additionally, by establishing uniform review guidelines, the
parent board should be able to ensure that most issues are adequately
addressed at the committee level, no matter which committee handles the
request. The other advantage of the task force is the ease and speed with
which it could be established; all that is required is the consent of the
agencies.2 64 It is not clear what would be required to enact the Working
Group's proposal. Thus, the task force would be the preferred proposal
if the Working Group's proposal required legislation which appeared un-
likely to gain sufficient Congressional consensus for enactment.
Other portions of the subcommittee's proposal should be adopted.
The member agencies should be prevented from approving proposals
without the parent board's assent.265 This would ensure that the parent
board's scientific review was an important part of the process. All com-
mittees should include ecologists and environmental scientists to ensure
that all the relevant environmental issues are raised. 266 The GAO should
review and clarify the USDA's authority 67 and the parent board should
also have authority to make binding decisions settling jurisdictional dis-
putes between the different agencies268 in order to pave the way for an
effective division of powers among the agencies.
Even with such a centralized coordinating authority in place, there
still are problems with the enabling statutes that need to be addressed.
As the subcommittee's report notes, the EPA's authority under TSCA
could well be challenged in court.2 69 The EPA might successfully argue
for an interpretation of "chemical substances and mixtures" that includes
microorganisms. However, amending TSCA to specifically include ge-
netically modified organisms could eliminate unnecessary delay and the
264. The subcommittee's proposal calls for the agencies voluntarily forming the inter-
agency task force.
265. Id. at 43.
266. Id. at 44.
267. Id.
268. See supra text following note 252.
269. STAFF REPORT, supra note I, at 50.
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uncertainty of judicial interpretation. TSCA also could be amended to
shift the burden of proof of safety onto the manufacturer, as under
FIFRA.270 This would make it easier for the EPA to regulate questiona-
ble substances where the risks are not clearly unreasonable. Since cata-
strophic consequences can result even from small test releases, 271 the
EPA should be given regulatory authority ninety days in advance of test-
ing, rather than ninety days in advance of manufacture. This would al-
low the EPA to intervene earlier and regulate testing for research rather
than testing for commercial purposes only. These changes would allow
TSCA to cover nearly all releases not regulated by other statutes.
C. Great Britain Application
While Great Britain has already placed genetic engineering under
one central authority, deliberate releases of genetically engineered orga-
nisms still may involve the authority and the expertise of several agen-
cies. The ACGM functions much like an interagency committee, giving
advice to other agencies on the practice of genetic engineering. 272 As in
the United States, however, additional legislation may be needed. There
should be specific statutory language giving the ACGM the authority to
consider environmental issues and specifying a government department
that can enforce ACGM decisions relating to those issues. To truly func-
tion as an interagency committee concerned with deliberate releases, the
ACGM should be expanded to include ecologists and environmental
scientists. Should such an expanded committee prove unwieldy, some-
thing like the United States Working Group's two-tiered structure might
prove useful.
VI. CONCLUSION
The advent of deliberate releases of genetically engineered orga-
nisms creates new regulatory problems for the United States, Great Brit-
ain, and other countries attempting to regulate the practice of genetic
engineering within their borders. The specifics of each country's laws
may vary, but a common formula may suggest what each needs to do to
ensure that its regulatory scheme is sufficient. First, the existing laws
must be examined to discover whether they provide comprehensive cov-
erage of all genetic experimentation, both public and private, that may
involve deliberate releases. Second, if the existing laws are found lacking,
270. See supra notes 155, 180, 181 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 207, 208, 223 and accompanying text.
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new legislation must be passed to fill in the gaps in the regulatory struc-
ture. Third, a body should be established to provide guidance to the vari-
ous agencies that have authority over genetic engineering. A high degree
of expertise is needed to deal with genetic engineering questions as the
issues can be quite technical and informed decisionmaking often involves
analysis of complex data. A centralized body can provide this expertise,
coordinate the efforts of the various agencies, and, by simplifying the ap-
proval process, eliminate any unnecessary delay in a very competitive
and fast moving field.
